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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Robert Conrad Macneilage was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of 
insurance fraud.  On appeal, Mr. Macneilage contends that the district court erred when 
it denied his motion to allow him to impeach the credibility of two State’s witnesses 
using their past felony convictions for burglary and theft of a credit card.  He also 
contends that his sentence is excessive and that the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished its jurisdiction.   
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contentions that any error 
occurring when the district court excluded relevant I.R.E. 609 evidence as to the nature 
of the felony convictions of Mr. Richard Gibson and Mr. Justin Hansen was harmless. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Macneilage’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it prohibited Mr. Macneilage from questioning the 
State’s witnesses on the substance of their past felony convictions pursuant to 
I.R.E. 609? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Macneilage 
excessively?1 
 




                                            
1 Mr. Macneilage fully addressed his sentencing issue and the issue regarding the 
relinquishment of jurisdiction in the initial Appellant’s Brief and will not be making 
additional arguments on these issues herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Macneilage’s Motion To Admit The Nature Of 
The Prior Convictions 
 
 The district court erred in denying Mr. Macneilage’s motion to be permitted to 
attack the credibility of two witnesses using information as to their past criminal 
convictions.  Defense counsel sought to use the nature of two of the State’s witnesses’ 
felony criminal convictions, pursuant to I.R.E. 609.  (Trial Tr., p.253, L.23 – p.258, L.13.)  
Richard Gibson had been convicted of possessing a stolen credit card, and Justin 
Hansen had been convicted of burglary.  (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.23-25; p.257, L.15 – p.258, 
L.11.)  The district court denied defense counsel’s request, finding that the crime of 
burglary was not one involving moral turpitude.  (Trial Tr., p.254, L.21 – p.255, L.6.)   
The State claims that, when seeking to admit evidence of the nature of the two 
felony convictions, Mr. Macneilage failed to argue that the nature of the convictions 
were relevant, and that, as a result, the issue of relevance was not preserved.  
(Respondent’s Brief, p.7.)  However, Mr. Macneilage argued that evidence of the nature 
of these witness’s prior felony convictions was admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 609, for 
which one of the tests is relevance.  Specifically, defense counsel argued that 
Mr. Hansen’s burglary conviction was “clearly within the grasp of the 609 rule, and it’s 
clearly a felony that -- conviction that reflects upon the credibility of the witness.”  (Trial 
Tr., p.254, Ls.5-8.)  The district court then ruled:  “-- based on what I’ve heard, I will 
allow reference to the fact that he has been convicted of a felony.  I will not allow 
reference to the nature of the felony.”  (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.21-24.)  In so ruling, the 
district court found that burglary was not “a crime of moral turpitude.”  (Trial Tr., p.254, 
L.24 – p.255, L.3.)  To Mr. Macneilage’s arguments that evidence of Mr. Gibson’s felony 
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conviction for grand theft by possession of a stolen credit card should be admitted, the 
district court referenced the rule before holding that it would not permit references to the 
nature of the crime.  (Trial Tr., p.257, L.16 – p.258, L.13.)  Defense counsel sought to 
have the nature of the criminal convictions admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 609(a).  (Trial 
Tr., p.253, L.22 – p.258, L.13.)  Because Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) requires 
analysis of:  (1) whether the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior 
conviction were relevant to the credibility of the witness; and (2) whether the probative 
value of admitting the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect,2 the issue of relevance 
was argued to the district court and thus preserved. 
The State concedes that Mr. Gibson’s and Mr. Hansen’s convictions were 
relevant for impeachment purposes.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.8.)  However, the State 
claims that such error was harmless, relying on State v. Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 
383-84 (1993), a case analyzing harmless error in which the Court found, “Error is 
harmless when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury’s 
verdict and the Court can ‘declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.13.)  Mr. Macneilage submits that the application of the 
harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),3 
requires additional analysis.  The question of whether the error at issue actually 
impacted the jury’s verdict, is the relevant inquiry under Chapman.  
                                            
2 State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630 (1999). 
3 Although Chapman, by its own terms, only applies to trial errors which violate the 
United States Constitution, see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21, the Perry Court held that “the 
harmless error test established in Chapman is now applied to all objected-to error,” 
even errors that violate only state law.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). 
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In Chapman, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that all 
constitutional errors require reversal.  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22.  Instead of adopting 
an automatic reversal rule for all constitutional errors, the Court adopted a harmless 
error standard borrowed from Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).  Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 23.  That harmless error standard was stated in Fahy as follows: “The question 
is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have 
contributed to the conviction.”  Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87.  In Chapman, the Court 
expressly embraced this standard.  See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23.  It then went on to 
note that it was doing “no more than adher[ing] to the meaning of [its] Fahy case” in 
holding that before a “constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able 
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 24.  Further, 
it observed, “[t]here is little, if any, difference between [its] statement in Fahy . . . about 
‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have 
contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.”  Id.  Thus, in both Fahy and Chapman the Supreme Court couched its 
harmless error test in terms of whether the error at issue may have actually impacted 
the verdict; neither case called for the reviewing court to speculate about the outcome of 
the trial in the absence of the error at issue.  Indeed, in both Fahy and Chapman, the 
Court made it clear that the relevant question is not whether, independent of the error at 
issue, the defendant is surely guilty.  First, in Fahy, the Court explicitly rejected such a 
standard, holding, “We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient 
evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence 
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complained of.”  Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87.  Then, in Chapman, the Court criticized and 
distinguished California’s harmless error standard for its “emphasis, and perhaps 
overemphasis upon the court’s view of ‘overwhelming evidence.’”  Chapman, 386 U.S. 
at 23. 
The Supreme Court reinforced this aspect of the Chapman standard in 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), in which the Court held:   
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which “the jury 
actually rested its verdict.”  The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a 
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been 
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
surely unattributable to the error.  That must be so, because to 
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered—no matter 
how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be—would 
violate the jury-trial guarantee.  
Id. at 279 (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991)) (italics in original).  Then, 
in explaining its holding—that a faulty reasonable doubt instruction requires automatic 
reversal—the Court reasoned that because no valid verdict is rendered when a faulty 
reasonable doubt instruction is utilized, “the entire premise of Chapman review is simply 
absent.”  Id. at 280.   This is so because,  
The most a reviewing court can conclude is that a jury would surely have 
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—not that the jury’s 
actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have 
been different absent the constitutional error.  That is not enough.  The 
Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a 
hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be 
sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty.   
Id. at 280 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
“A reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry does not, as Justice 
Traynor put it, ‘become in effect a second jury to determine whether the defendant is 
guilty.’”  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999) (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle 
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of Harmless Error 21 (1970)).  Correctly applied, the Chapman harmless error standard 
requires the reviewing court to focus on the likely impact the error in question actually 
had on the verdict rendered. 
Mr. Macneilage contends that the errors that occurred during his trial were not 
harmless in this case—the errors surely contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict.   
Here, it was clear that all of the people who claimed they were present when 
Mr. Macneilage made statements about purposefully damaging the car “had all 
expressed to [ ] having disagreements with Mr. Macneilage.”  (Trial Tr., p.376, Ls.24-
25.)  For example, Mr. Gibson was angry with Mr. Macneilage.  The two men had gotten 
into a physical altercation where law enforcement was called and Mr. Gibson was 
charged with disturbing the peace and with battering Mr. Macneilage’s three year old 
daughter.  (Trial Tr., p.155, L.19 – p.156, L.10; p.157, L.13 – p.158, L.1.)  Mr. Gibson 
sent text messages to Mr. Macneilage, harassing him and threatening to report the 
insurance fraud unless Mr. Macneilage dropped the charges.  (Trial Tr., p.153, L.21 – 
p.162, L.7.)  Mr. Gibson retaliated by calling the insurance company and reporting that 
Mr. Macneilage committed fraud.  (Trial Tr., p.131, Ls.11-23.)  Mr. Gibson admitted that 
he was mad at Mr. Macneilage, and he contacted the insurance company to report that 
Mr. Macneilage had committed insurance fraud because his attempt to blackmail 
Mr. Macneilage into dropping the battery charges had failed.  (Trial Tr., p.131, Ls.11-23; 
p.132, Ls.7-25; p.153, L.21 – p.164, L.17.)  He gave the investigators several names of 
individuals who were allegedly present when Mr. Macneilage talked about damaging the 
car.  (Trial Tr., p.165, L.25 – p.166, L.3.)  One name he provided was that of Courtney 
Fanning, his girlfriend, who did not testify at the trial but supposedly was present when 
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Mr. Macneilage made statements about wrecking the car.  (Trial Tr., p.121, L.22 – 
p.124, L.9; p.127, Ls.1-10.)  Tanner Meyers was identified, but he was Mr. Gibson’s 
friend who worked for Mr. Macneilage at the time.  (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.13-16.)  Further, 
Tanner Myers was angry with Mr. Macneilage for firing him and not paying him what he 
was owed.4  Richard Gibson was Ronald Gibson’s brother.  (Trial Tr., p.259, Ls.11-17.)  
Justin Hansen testified that, at the time, he was friends with Mr. Macneilage,5 and 
sharing shop space with Ronald Gibson.  (Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.12-18.)   
In denying Mr. Macneilage the ability to examine the two witnesses about the 
substance of their past felony convictions, the district court significantly impeded 
Mr. Macneilage’s ability to call into question the veracity of these witnesses.  Ultimately, 
all of the parties to the conversation in which jokes were made about how to 
intentionally damage the BMW were people who either were friends or relatives of 
Mr.  Gibson and/or had a history of dishonesty as shown through felony criminal 
convictions for crimes involving fraud or dishonesty.6  (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.6-10.)  Thus, 
all of the individuals had a motive to lie.  Only Justin Hansen appeared to be uninvolved 
with the spat between Mr. Gibson and Mr. Macneilage.  (Trial Tr., p.377, Ls.7-8.)  As 
such, his veracity was critically important at trial.  However, Mr. Hansen had been 
                                            
4 Tanner Myers was a disgruntled former employee of Mr. Macneilage’s (Trial Tr., p.186, 
Ls.11-20; p.229, L.13 – p.231, L.24) and a friend of Mr. Ronald Gibson (Trial Tr., p.227, 
L.24 – p.228, L.16).   
5 Although he was not questioned about the current status of his friendship with 
Mr. Macneilage, he used past tense verbiage, apparently indicating he was no longer 
friends with Mr. Macneilage.  
6 While the BMW parts counter employee, Clint Lish, testified that Mr. Macneilage 
appeared upset that the parts were not yet available, he testified only that he heard 
Mr. Macneilage talk about “getting rid of the car,” not purposefully wrecking it.  (Trial 
Tr., p.243, L.20 – p.244, L.16.) 
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convicted of burglary—a crime involving dishonesty or fraud—information that defense 
counsel was not permitted to elicit. 
The State contends that Mr. Macneilage “did not even bother to ask either 
Gibson or Hansen about their conviction.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.13.)  However, 
whether the information that Mr. Hansen had been convicted of a felony occurred 
because he volunteered it during his direct examination, or whether such information 
was elicited by defense counsel is immaterial to whether the district court’s ruling was 
harmless error.  The district court had already ruled that the nature of the conviction 
could not be elicited.   
Further, because the nature of the felony conviction was directly related to 
Mr. Gibson’s truthfulness, defense counsel’s failure to elicit the felony conviction, of 
which the district court had already ruled counsel could not follow up with questions on 
the nature of the conviction, does not negate Mr. Macneilage’s argument that the district 
court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from introducing such information.7 
The State cites State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786 (Ct. App. 2012), as illustrative that 
Mr. Macneilage failed to develop a record adequate to support his claims.  
(Respondent’s Brief, p.8.)  However, in Grist it was only known that the witness had 
been convicted of “theft”; the court did not know what statute the witness was convicted 
under.  152 Idaho at 791.  Here, the district court knew that Mr. Hansen had been 
convicted of burglary.  (Trial Tr., p.254, L.21 – p.255, L.1.)  It knew Richard Gibson had 
been convicted of possession of a stolen credit card.  (Trial Tr., p.257, Ls.16-22.)  The 
                                            
7 Prior to the I.R.E. 609 hearing, Mr. Ronald Gibson had testified that Mr. Macneilage 
was trying to get Richard Gibson and Justin Hansen to wreck the car “because they 
already had criminal records.”  (Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.17-20.) 
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district court could thus determine whether fraud or deceit was involved.  Further, Grist 
was a case in which the witness’s credibility was not central to the case—here, there 
was no physical evidence that Mr. Macneilage committed the crime of insurance fraud.  
The case hinged on the credibility of witnesses.  (Trial Tr., p.395, L.12 – p.397, L.25; 
p.398, L.20 – p.402, L.10.)   
Thus, the district court’s error in excluding the nature of Mr. Hansen’s and 




Mr. Macneilage respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand for a new trial.  Alternatively, Mr. Macneilage requests that this Court place him 
on probation or reduce his sentence as it sees fit. 
 DATED this 4th day of October, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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